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NITZ V STATE: SKEWING THE
EVIDENTIARY RULES TO PROSECUTE
CHILD MOLESTERS
I. INTRODUCTION
In Nitz v. State I the Alaska Court of Appeals faced the difficult
problem of determining the extent to which evidence of prior consis-
tent statements 2 and of prompt complaints of sexual assault3 may be
admitted to bolster the testimony of the alleged victim of a crime. In
Nitz the defendant, Richard Nitz, appealed a jury conviction on four
counts of lewd and lascivious acts towards children, three counts of
sexual assault in the first degree, and two counts of sexual abuse of a
minor.4 The convictions resulted from charges that, over a period of
approximately four years, Nitz committed a series of sexual assaults
against his stepdaughter, T.K.. She was seven years old when the as-
saults began and almost eleven years old when they ended.5
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed all the convictions and
remanded for a retrial.6 The court's opinion in Nitz contained two
confusing evidentiary rulings, the first involving prior consistent state-
ments, and the second involving the doctrine of prompt complaints of
sexual assault. The court of appeals found that T.K.'s prior consistent
statements, which had been offered before she had testified at trial,
Copyright © 1987 by Alaska Law Review
1. 720 P.2d 55 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
2. A prior consistent statement is testimony by a third party of an earlier state-
ment by the declarant which is consistent with the declarant's testimony at trial. It is
offered to rebut a charge that the declarant fabricated his testimony by revealing to the
jury that the declarant had made a similar statement at an earlier point in time.
Although a prior consistent statement could be considered hearsay, since it enters into
evidence through the testimony of a third party, an exception exists where it is not
treated as hearsay as long as the requirements for its admission are met. See, e.g.,
Travers, Prior Consistent Statements, 57 NEB. L. REV. 974 (1978).
3. A prompt complaint is a statement in which a third party testifies to having
heard an alleged victim to a sexual assault complain of having been assaulted shortly
after the sexual assault was supposed to have occurred. Like a prior consistent state-
ment, a prompt complaint is technically hearsay, but because of a traditional excep-
tion to the hearsay rule it is not excluded from evidence. See, e.g., 4 J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1123 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).




were not properly admissible. 7 Although this decision was consistent
with the applicable Alaska Rule of Evidence,8 the court's analysis of
the prior consistent statements made by the victim and introduced
during trial marked a departure from the common law by holding that
prior consistent statements made after a motive to testify falsely has
arisen are not subject to automatic exclusion. Rather, the court held
that, "the admission of prior consistent statements made after a mo-
tive to falsify has arisen should be treated as a question of relevance, or
determination on a case-by-case basis." 9 The court elaborated on the
process for determining whether a prior consistent statement is admis-
sible as evidence:
In each instance where admission is sought, the trial court must
begin by determining whether the prior statement is actually rele-
vant to rebut an express or implied charge.., of recent fabrication
or improper influence of motive .... Next, if the court finds the
statement to be actually relevant, it must proceed to balance the
probative value of the statement against its potential for creating
unfair prejudice.... Finally, if the court determines the statement
to be admissible, it must instruct the jury that the statement should
be considered for the limited purpose of determining the credibility
of the declarant's trial testimony and that it should not be consid-
ered directly as proof that the matters asserted in it are true.10
Nitz not only established a new interpretation of Alaska Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) as it applies to prior consistent statements, it
also enunciated a confusing and inconsistent interpretation of the
traditional, common law doctrine of prompt complaint to sexual as-
sault."' At common law, the prompt complaint doctrine 12 allowed the
victim's complaint of sexual abuse to be admitted into evidence
through the testimony of a third person, who was informed of the at-
tack by the victim shortly after it occurred. Such evidence was admit-
ted, despite its inherently unreliable hearsay quality, in situations in
which its absence would lead the jury to infer that the victim's com-
plaint was fabricated, or where it qualified as an excited utterance.' 3
In Nitz, however, the court of appeals upheld the admission of prompt
complaint testimony when neither of these conditions was present. In-
stead, the Nitz court, relying upon an earlier decision by the Alaska
7. Id. at 69.
8. ALASKA R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
9. Nitz, 720 P.2d at 68.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 62-63.
12. A statement of prompt complaint is sometimes called a "fresh complaint."
Graham, The Cry of Rape: The Prompt Complaint Doctrine and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 19 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 489 (1983) [hereinafter Graham, The Prompt
Complaint Doctrine].
13. Id. at 489-90.
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Supreme Court in Greenway v. State, 14 disregarded the absence of a
prompt complaint exception in the Alaska Rules of Evidence, and held
that this absence was "merely an oversight" by the drafters.1 5 Fur-
thermore, the court of appeals allowed significant details of T.K.'s first
complaint to come into testimony, whereas the traditional doctrine
simply allowed testimony of the fact of the complaint. As a result, it
appears that the court of appeals overlooked the historical precedent
against admission of hearsay evidence, except in limited situations
where the evidence possesses clear indicia of reliability. Finally, the
Nitz court failed to determine what should be considered a "prompt"
period of time after a sexual assault for purposes of the prompt com-
plaint doctrine.
Taken in concert, the two holdings in Nitz represent a reaction by
the Alaska Court of Appeals to the now visible problem of child sexual
assault, and to some of the evidentiary problems that arise in such
cases. In its zeal to respond to the problems attendant upon child sex-
ual abuse, the court of appeals has neglected to consider the historical
justifications for limited admissibility of prior consistent statements
and for cries of prompt complaint. As a result, the court has enunci-
ated standards that unnecessarily skew the logic of allowing into evi-
dence such statements. Furthermore, its decision to create, in effect,
an exception to the rule against hearsay for child sexual assault cases
brings into question the uniformity of the evidentiary rules.
While this note argues that the courts should primarily be con-
cerned with maintaining the uniform application of evidentiary rules,
it is unrealistic to assume that courts should, or can, completely ignore
the consequences of a strict application of hearsay standards in child
molestation cases. The number of cases alleging sexual abuse of young
children has increased dramatically in recent years.16 Whether the in-
cidence or merely the recognition of sexual abuse is increasing, 17 the
subject is one that has recently come under increased public scrutiny.
The admissibility of hearsay evidence is but one of several evidentiary
considerations common to sexual abuse cases.' 8 It is estimated that
14. 626 P.2d 1060 (Alaska 1980).
15. Nitz 720 P.2d at 62.
16. See D. FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN 53 (1979) (citing sur-
vey results which indicate that one in five females and one in 11 males are sexually
victimized as children).
17. Sgroi, Sexual Molestation of Children, in CHILDREN TODAY 18-19 (1975)
("No one knows the true incidence of child molestation in the United States today.").
Incidents of sexual abuse are vastly underreported, especially when the sexual assault
is committed by a family member. See Kemp, Sexual Abuse, Another Hidden Pediat-
ric Problem, in THE 1977 C. ANDERSON ALDRICH LECTURE IN CHILD ABUSE: COM-
MISSION AND OMISSION 97, 99 (J. Cook & R. Bowles eds. 1980).
18. There are several aspects common to sexual abuse cases that raise hearsay
issues. One is the use of leading questions. See Note, The Unreliability of Expert
1987]
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sexual abuse occurs in one out of four families. Twenty to thirty per-
cent of all girls and ten percent of all boys will be victimized by age
sixteen; seventy percent of these children will be victimized at the
hands of their parents or family members.19 Alaska has a higher rate
of child abuse/neglect cases than any other state in the country. 20
Thus, the perception of an Alaska sexual abuse epidemic raises com-
plex issues that both the Alaska courts and the Alaska Legislature
must consider seriously and comprehensively.
Section II of this note summarizes the common law of prior con-
sistent statements in order to provide an historical context for the
complexity engendered in their use. Section III provides an overview
of the status of prior consistent statements since the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, as well as an analysis of the varying re-
quirements for their use developed by both federal and state courts.
Section IV considers the position taken by the Alaska Court of Ap-
peals in Nitz on whether a declarant's motive to fabricate must have
arisen before the prior statement was made in order to admit that
prior statement into evidence. Particularly, it criticizes the Nitz crite-
ria for the admissibility of prior consistent statements as well as the
Nitz court's illogical distinction between substantive evidence and re-
habilitative evidence. Furthermore, it debunks the Nitz court's faith in
the efficacy of limiting instructions to distinguish different qualities of
evidence for the jury. Section V focuses on the prompt complaint doc-
trine and its common law roots. Section VI analyzes the interpreta-
tion of the prompt complaint doctrine in Alaska under Nitz and its
progeny. Finally, section VII forwards a suggested amendment to the
Alaska Rules of Evidence, and recommends a limited child hearsay
exception for prompt complaints, which would protect the underlying
interest seemingly guiding the Nitz court: the protection of child sex-
ual assault victims from unduly traumatic impeachment.
Testimony on the Typical Characteristics of Sexual Abuse Victims, 74 GEo. L.J. 429,
429 (1985) [hereinafter Note, The Unreliability of Expert Testimony]. Another issue is
the competence of children to testify at trial. See A. YARNEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 204-05 (1979) (arguing that children possess inferior long-
term and short-term memories). But see Melton, Children's Competency to Testify, 5
LAW & HUM. BEHAV., 73, 76-77 (1981) (citing studies indicating that children re-
member facts as well as adults do). A third concern is the admissibility of expert
testimony to show that the child's behavior typifies the behavior of sexual assult vic-
tims. See Note, The Unreliability of Expert Testimony, supra.
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II. COMMON LAW HISTORY OF PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
The historical development of the rules surrounding the employ-
ment of a prior consistent statement closely parallels the fashioning of
the rule against hearsay.21 Until the early sixteenth century, juries
rarely were instructed to depend upon the testimony of witnesses in
order to reach a verdict.22 The modem concept of the witness did not
become a feature of jury trials until the early sixteenth century. 23 As
the relevancy of a witness' testimony increased in importance, how-
ever, the procedure for admitting such evidence became a point of de-
bate.24 Among those facts admissible as evidence were testimony of
the witness regarding statements made by another person.25 These
hearsay statements were admitted as substantive evidence into the sev-
enteenth century, 26 though often over the objection of the accused.27
By the early eighteenth century the notion prevailed in English
common law that a witness' testimony could always be corroborated
by evidence of his having made statements consistent with the ones he
made in court.28 The development of this notion reflected the belief in
the instinctive logic that such evidence provided truly corroborative
support to the in-court statement. 29 By the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury, however, the cumulative concerns of jurists who valued the relia-
bility of in-court testimony coalesced into a trend favoring the notion
that such evidence was violative of the concept of hearsay.30 As a
result, a third variety of out-of-court statement, now known as the
prior consistent statement, came to be categorized as hearsay. Despite
its status as hearsay, however, prior consistent statements could be
introduced on direct examination of the witness in order to corrobo-
rate his in-court testimony.31
In the early nineteenth century further objections arose to the use
of prior consistent statements, despite their classification as hearsay.
As a result, the principle developed of not allowing the testimony of a
witness to be corroborated on direct examination with the use of in-
21. Graham, Prior Consistent Statements: Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, Critique and Proposal, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 575, 577 (1978) [hereinafter
Graham, Prior Consistent Statements]. For a history of the rule against hearsay, see 5
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 1364.
22. Graham, Prior Consistent Statements, supra note 21, at 577.
23. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1364, at 15.
24. Id. § 1364, at 17.
25. Id.
26. R. v. Thomas Dyer 99b (1553), cited in 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1364,
at 16 n.25.
27. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1364, at 15.
28. 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1123, at 254.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. § 1123, at 254 n.1.
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court testimony of a prior consistent statement.32 The rules began to
acquire the now-familiar characteristic of allowing such statements
into evidence solely to rebut evidence aimed at impeaching the credi-
bility of the witness. Furthermore, the statement was admitted to re-
habilitate a witness' credibility, and not as substantive evidence of the
matter asserted by the witness.33 These factors remained the domi-
nant characteristics of the law of prior consistent statements until the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.34 It is impor-
tant to note, however, that for nearly two hundred years, both English
and American courts have enforced, except in the very limited circum-
stances delineated above, a general prohibition against the use of prior
consistent statements.35
III. PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE AND THE ALASKA RULES OF
EVIDENCE
The promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975
marked a new period of development in the history of prior consistent
statements. The Federal Rules of Evidence allow the admission of
prior consistent statements in the federal courts as substantive evi-
dence in both criminal and civil matters, as long as the evidence is
relevant to rebut specified attacks upon the credibility of the in-court
witness.3 6 In contrast to the common law, Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(B)
classifies a prior consistent statement as "non-hearsay," thereby af-
fording these statements the qualitative status of substantive evi-
dence.37 Specifically, the Rule provides that a statement is not hearsay
if:
[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement, and the statement is... con-
sistent with this testimony and is offered to rebut an express or im-
plied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence
or motive .... 38
The text of Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(B) has been interpreted to re-
quire three specific conditions to be met for the prior statement to be
32. Id. §§ 1123-1124.
33. Graham, Prior Consistent Statements, supra note 21, at 578.
34. Id.
35. Annotation, Effect of Rule 801 (d)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Evidence Upon
the Admissibility of a Witness'Prior Consistent Statement, 47 A.L.R. FED. 639 (1980).
36. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
37. Id.
38. Id. Considerable debate has arisen in the federal circuits as to the meaning of
the terms "recent fabrication" and "improper influence or motive" within the Rule.
For discussion of these issues, see S. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANUAL 723 (1986).
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classified as non-hearsay. First, the declarant must testify at the trial
and must be subject to cross-examination.39 Second, the testimony of
the witness as to the prior statement must have been consistent with
the declarant's testimony as a witness.4° Third, the prior statement
must have been offered to rebut an express or implied41 charge against
the declarant of recent fabrication42 or improper influence or motive.
4 3
Many courts have extrapolated a fourth requirement out of the
language of rule 801(d)(1)(B), holding that the prior consistent state-
ment must be made before the time that the suggested motive to falsify
arose. The general argument for this fourth requirement is that any
prior statement made after a motive to fabricate arose is cumulative in
value, and is of no more value than the original recitation of the simi-
lar statement at trial. Specifically, courts in the Second,"4 Seventh,45
Ninth,46 and District of Columbi 7 Circuits have taken the position
39. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B). See also United States v. Strand, 547 F.2d
993 (9th Cir. 1978) (prior statements to disprove bribery charge held inadmissible
under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) since the accused had not yet testified).
40. See FED. R. EVID. Rule 801(d)(1)(B). See also United States v. Check, 582
F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1978) (prior statement of unavailable witness to a narcotics sale held
inadmissible since the in-court testimony was not consistent with prior testimony).
41. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) treats both express and implied im-
peachment of cross-examination similarly. For delineation of the distinction between
the two terms, see Graham, Prior Consistent Statements, supra note 21, at 585-86.
42. The use of the word "recent" in Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is superfluous, as the
fabrication implied on cross-examination exists in the jury's mind regardless of when
the fabrication is determined to have crystallized in the witness' mind. See Graham,
Prior Consistent Statements, supra note 21, at 582-83.
43. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B). See also United States v. Lombardi, 550
F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1977) (government allowed to show that its witness' in-court state-
ment was credible through introduction of prior statement after defense called into
question the validity and crediblity of the in-court statement on cross-examination);
United States v. Majors, 584 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1978) (prior statement allowed into
evidence even where it constituted an effort to discredit declarant's testimony). For a
discussion of the definition of the terms "improper influence" and "motive," see Gra-
ham, Prior Consistent Statements, supra note 21, at 584-85.
44. See United States v. James, 609 F.2d 36, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 905 (1980) (a witness' grand jury testimony occurred before motive to fabri-
cate story about defendant arose, thereby allowing admission of the prior statement
made before the grand jury); United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 232-34 (2d Cir.
1978) (reversal of conviction for tax evasion; the court stated that the "proponent
must demonstrate that the prior consistent statement was made prior to the time that
the supposed motive to falsify arose").
45. See United States v. Guevara, 598 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir. 1979) (rebuttal
testimony not admissible where the prior statement did not predate the motive to
fabricate); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1351-52 (7th Cir. 1979) (rebut-
tal testimony of defendant's accountant that defendant earlier received bribe money
was ruled inadmissible since it did not predate motive to fabricate).
46. United States v. Gualtnes, 790 F.2d 1327, 1384 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing United
States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1983)); United States v. DeCoito, 764 F.2d
690 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429).
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that a prior consistent statement made after the supposed motive to
falsify arose is of no value, since it was subject to the same influences
to falsify as the trial testimony. Courts in the Fourth,48 Fifth,49
Sixth,50 Seventh,5 1 Eighth,52 Tenth, 53 and Eleventh 54 Circuits, how-
ever, have admitted prior consistent statements without the limitation
that they must have been made before the existence of a motive to
fabricate. The First and Third Circuits have not decided the issue.
Nineteen states have adopted Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(B) verba-
tim.55 Arkansas has adopted the 1974 Uniform Rule, which is identi-
cal to the federal rule.5 6 Additionally, Hawaii,57 Maine,5 8 Montana,5 9
Nevada, 60 and Oregon 61 have enacted rules that are substantially simi-
lar to the federal rule. Thus, at least twenty-five states have enacted
evidentiary rules that are similar to Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(B) in their
description of a prior consistent statement. Furthermore, a number of
47. United States v. Sampole, 636 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
48. United States v. Parodi, 793 F.2d 768 (4th Cir. 1983).
49. United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Wil-
liams, 573 F.2d 284, 289 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978) (prior statement may be made to rebut
charge of improper motive even though statement was made after alleged motive
arose; statement used substantively).
50. United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1273-74 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983) (rebuttal evidence allowed even where impeached prosecu-
tion witness could not be rehabilitated by evidence predating the implication of his
motive to fabricate in order to gain plea bargain).
51. United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 398-99 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that
prior statement is outside the scope of 801(d)(1)(B) because it was offered as "rehabili-
tative evidence;" thus, the fact that it did not predate motive to fabricate was consid-
ered irrelevant).
52. United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1121-22 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 940 (1978) (holding that the requirement for prior statement to predate the mo-
tive to fabricate is an "unnecessary refinement").
53. United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1349 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 918 (1981) (following Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109).
54. United States v. Anderson, 782 F.2d 908, 915-16 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding
that a prior consistent statement is inadmissible merely because it was made after the
declarant developed a motive to fabricate).
55. See 4. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE § 801(d)(1)(B)
[01] (1986 supplement). The nineteen states are: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Dela-
ware, Florida, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming.
56. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (1979); UNIF. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) (amended
1974).
57. HAW. R. EvID. 802.1(2).
58. MAINE R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
59. MONT. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
60. NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.035(1)(B) (1986).
61. ORE. R. EVID. 801(4)(a)(B).
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state courts, including those in Arizona, 62 California, 63 Maine,64
Michigan,65 Nevada,66 South Dakota,67 and Washington 68 have held
that the prior statement must have predated the motive to fabricate in
order to be admitted into evidence on rebuttal.
Before the promulgation of the Alaska Rules of Evidence in 1979,
courts in Alaska followed the traditional common law regarding the
admission of prior consistent statements insofar as it admitted as sub-
stantive evidence prior statements that predated the motive to fabri-
cate.69 The Alaska Supreme Court, in Buchanan v. State, 70 stated the
law in Alaska: "It is firmly established that if the credibility of a wit-
ness has been attacked on the basis that influence of others has altered
her story, supporting evidence in the nature of prior consistent state-
ments may then be introduced. ' 71 Buchanan did not indicate, how-
ever, whether the motive to fabricate must have postdated the prior
statement. Further, it remained unclear whether evidence of the prior
statement would be admitted as "rehabilitative evidence" 72 alone, and
not as substantive evidence, if a motive to fabricate had existed before
the making of the prior statement.73
The commentators to the Alaska Rules of Evidence did not make
clear whether the rules that they were endeavoring to enact were to be
included within the traditional common law interpretation of the ad-
mission of prior consistent statements.74 The Alaska Rules of Evi-
dence were effectuated in 1979. 75 Alaska Rules of Evidence section
62. See State v. Martin, 135 Ariz. 552, 553-54, 663 P.2d 236, 237-39 (1983).
63. E.g., People v. Utter, 24 Cal. App. 3d 535, 101 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1972).
64. See State v. Swain, 493 A.2d 1056, 1058-59 (Me. 1985).
65. See People v. Therrien, 97 Mich. App. 633, 296 N.W.2d 8 (1980).
66. See Smith v. State, 100 Nev. 471, 686 P.2d 247 (1984).
67. See State v. Thompson, 379 N.W.2d 295, 296-98 (S.D. 1985).
68. See State v. Harper, 35 Wash. App. 855, 857-59, 670 P.2d 296, 298-300
(1983).
69. See, e.g., Buchanan v. State, 554 P.2d 1153 (Alaska 1976); Nicholson v. State,
570 P.2d 1058 (Alaska 1976).
70. 554 P.2d 1153.
71. Id. at 1157 (citing FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)). In Buchanan the defendant
appealed a conviction for commission of lewd and lascivious acts on a child. The
court affirmed his conviction. Id. at 1167.
72. See discussion of "rehabilitative evidence," infra section II.
73. In Buchanan, the court cited Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) seem-
ingly as general support for the underlying requirements of reliability in prior consis-
tent statements. 554 P.2d at 1157 n.9. Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(B) only allows into
evidence a prior statement used substantively. There is no clear indication whether
the court in Buchanan intended its citation of the Federal Rule to restrict Alaska
solely to the strict interpretation of the text of 801(d)(1)(B), and thereby to exlude the
possibility of a prior statement antedating a motive to fabricate coming in as "rehabili-
tative evidence" alone, rather than as substantive evidence.
74. ALASKA R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) commentary.
75. Alaska Supreme Court Order 364 (August 1, 1979).
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801(d)(1)(B) adopted the language of its federal counterpart verba-
tim, 76 and the commentary following the Alaska rule mirrors the com-
mentary found in the federal rules. The Alaska Rules of Evidence
commentary for section 801(d)(1)(B), as well as the Federal Rules
commentary, states that "prior consistent statements have been admis-
sible to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or
motives, but not as substantive evidence."' 77 This statement, however,
does not clarify whether the Alaska rules themselves were designed to
fall within this rubric. In short, the Alaska rules commentary pro-
vides no more guidance than does the federal commentary as to
whether the in-court testimony by a third party must postdate the
prior statement in order for that prior statement to be admitted as
evidence of any sort.
IV. THE NIrz DECISION
In Nitz v. State, 78 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that evidence
of a witness' prior statements consistent with his testimony may some-
times be relevant and admissible under Alaska Rule of Evidence
801(d)(1)(B) even if the statements were made after the witness' al-
leged motive to fabricate arose.79 The court's holding is very contro-
versial. Furthermore, the decision rendered by the court in Nitz masks
an attempt to grapple with the developing problem of the sexual as-
sault of children through the use of supposedly uniform rules of
evidence.
The court in Nitz revealed its underlying concerns in the very first
sentence of its opinion: "In this case, we must determine the extent to
which evidence of prior consistent statements may be admitted to bol-
ster the testimony of the victim in a case involving the sexual abuse of a
child.'"80 This statement reveals much about the overriding policy
concerns preoccupying the judges when they considered the matter on
appeal. A close reading of the opinion indicates that the court rejected
the traditional approach to prior consistent statements at least partly
because the offenses charged in the case involved sexual crimes against
children, and not because of evidentiary reasoning considered apart
from the factual background of the case.
A possible explanation for the Nitz court's decision to reinterpret
the standard required for admission of prior statements is found in the
frustratingly complex procedural history of the Nitz case itself. On
76. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
77. ALASKA R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) commentary; see also FED. R. EvID. 801(d)
(1)(B) commentary.
78. 720 P.2d 55 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
79. Id. at 64-68.
80. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).
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October 8, 1982, Richard Nitz was arrested for sexually molesting his
stepdaughter, T.K.. s1 Nitz was charged by indictment on October 12,
1982, with six counts of lewd and lascivious acts toward children,8 2
four counts of sexual assault in the first degree,83 and two counts of
sexual abuse of a minor.8 4 On December 23, 1982, Nitz moved to
dismiss the indictment, contending that the prosecution had failed to
present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.85 The motion to dis-
miss was granted on January 18, 1983, but two days later Nitz was
reindicted.8 6 The second indictment was also subsequently dismissed,
because the state had improperly presented hearsay evidence to the
grand jury.87 After considering and rejecting the option of seeking
appellate review of the second dismissal, the state indicted Nitz for the
third time. The third indictment was also dismissed on the ground
that Nitz had not been properly indicted within the 120 day speedy
trial requirement.8 8 On appeal, the Alaska Court of Appeals con-
cluded that Nitz's third indictment should not have been dismissed
and reversed the superior court's order of dismissal.8 9 The case was
remanded to the superior court on June 26, 1984.90 The almost two
years that passed between Nitz's first indictment and his trial may
have provided an impetus for the court of appeals to decide the case as
it did.
Eventually, Nitz was convicted by a jury of four counts of lewd
and lascivious acts toward children,91 three counts of sexual assault in
the first degree, 92 and two counts of sexual abuse of a minor.93 He was
sentenced to a total of twenty-two years of imprisonment. 94 Nitz had
been charged with committing a series of sexual assaults upon his step-
daughter, T.K., including fondling her breasts and vagina, and engag-
ing in acts of fellatio and cunnilingus with her. The assaults allegedly
began when she was seven years old and ended when she was eleven
years old. 95 These incidents first came to light when a neighbor, Paula
81. See State v. Nitz, 684 P.2d 134, 136 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
82. ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.134 (repealed 1978).
83. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410(a)(4) (repealed 1983).
84. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.440(a)(2) (repealed 1983).
85. Nitz, 684 P.2d at 136.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id see ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 45.
89. Brief for Appellant at 4, Nitz v. State, 720 P.2d 55 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986)
(No. A-781) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant].
90. Id.
91. ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.134 (repealed 1978).
92. Id. § 11.41.410(a)(4) (repealed 1983).
93. Id. § 11.41.440(a)(2) (repealed 1983).
94. Brief for Appellant supra note 89, at 9.
95. Nitz, 720 P.2d at 58.
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Hall, noticed the irregular behavior of T.K.. Hall reported her suspi-
cions to Dorothy Nitz, T.K.'s mother. When Dorothy Nitz finally
approached her daughter and asked whether "daddy [had] been both-
ering [her]," T.K. allegedly replied in the affirmative.96
Over the next several months numerous people questioned T.K.
about her father's behavior toward her, including an Anchorage police
officer, an employee of the Alaska Division of Family and Youth Serv-
ices, and a psychiatrist. She was removed from her home two days
after Nitz was arrested. According to the trial court's findings of fact,
T.K. provided during the two days after her removal from the home
only a "sketchy" description of what had happened to her.97 It took
four months of meetings with police representatives and with her child
psychiatrist before T.K. provided more complete descriptions of Nitz's
alleged behavior toward her.98
As part of its analysis of the potential admissibility of prior con-
sistent statements, the Nitz court attempted to draw a distinction be-
tween "rehabilitative" evidence and "substantive" evidence. In the
court's view, so-called rehabilitative evidence, or evidence offered
"solely to rehabilitate a witness," 99 differs in quality from so-called
substantive evidence, which is admitted "as evidence of the matters
asserted in... [certain]... statements."' 00 The distinction drawn by
Nitz is its determination that Alaska Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B)
permits the use of rehabilitative evidence at the discretion of the court,
even where a motive to falsely testify has previously arisen in testi-
mony. This distinction between the two "types" of evidence miscon-
strues the actual differences between these evidentiary terms, and
consequently undervalues the misuse of such evidence.
Substantive evidence is evidence of matters directly asserted in
the proferred statements. By way of example, assume that witness
Jones testifies that he heard defendant Smith state that he intended to
rob the local supermarket. This statement is substantive when it is
interpreted by the jury to tend to prove that Smith actually intended to
rob the supermarket. Such evidence, interpreted substantively, would
be damning to Smith in a case in which he was charged with robbing
the supermarket. Non-substantive evidence, however, would allow a
jury to interpret this scenario to mean only that Jones believed that he
heard Smith make the statement of intent to rob the store. The dis-
tinction between these two terms is qualitative in import. The value
96. Id.
97. Id. at 59.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 66 (citing United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1985)).
100. Id.
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attached to Jones' testimony assumes markedly different dimensions
depending on which quality of evidence is attached to that testimony.
The term "rehabilitative evidence" is not precisely defined in any
evidentiary treatise. The logical conclusion, however, is that the term
"rehabilitative" does not refer to the quality of the evidence, but to the
point in time at which it comes into evidence. When Nitz states that
rehabilitative evidence is offered "for the limited purpose of rehabili-
tating the testimony of the impeached witness," 101 the court of appeals
implicitly recognizes the temporal significance of such evidence. The
need to rehabilitate a witness logically arises only after that witness'
veracity is brought into question through adverse evidence. Theoreti-
cally, rehabilitative evidence could fall within either the substantive or
non-substantive category; there simply is nothing about the appendage
"rehabilitative" to the word "evidence" which indicates the import
that is to be given to that evidence.
Brought to a less theoretical level, the Nitz distinction between
substantive evidence and rehabilitative evidence ignores the fact that
juries are unable to detect the difference between the terms "rehabilita-
tive" and "substantive." One of the Nitz requirements is that the
judge must instruct the jury that any prior consistent statement which
was originally made after a motive to fabricate arose, is entered into
evidence for the "limited purpose of determining the credibility of the
declarant's trial testimony... [and not]... directly as proof that the
matters asserted in it are true."10 2 Superficially, this warning provides
an adequate explanation to assure that the jury does not overrate the
qualitative import of such testimony. However, two problems exist in
the application of the Nitz limiting instruction.
First, it is not at all clear that a jury is capable of understanding
the distinction between rehabilitative evidence and substantive evi-
dence. This problem raises the question of whether limiting instruc-
tions generally are a valuable tool for directing a jury to consider
evidence only for a particular purpose. The general argument made
favoring the use of limiting instructions is based on little more than an
instinctive faith-by judges and others-that such instructions are un-
derstandable to the jury. In contrast, the argument against the use of
limiting instructions is based upon years of empirical research, the
sum of which indicates that limiting instructions actually serve to sen-
sitize the jury to the evidence which it is being asked not to con-
sider. 0 3 Thus, the instruction required by Nitz, informing the jury
101. Id.
102. Id. at 68.
103. The University of Chicago Jury Project used experimental juries, intensive
jury interviews, and statistical data to test various hypotheses in an attempt to uncover
the mysteries of the jury process. In its study of jurors' ability to follow limiting
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that the prior consistent statements which it hears are admissible only
to "rehabilitate" the veracity of the victim, most probably will serve to
highlight for the jury the potential for considering such evidence as
proof that the victim's recollection is itself the truth.
Additionally, even if it is assumed that jurors are capable of un-
derstanding the purported distinction between substantive and rehabil-
itative evidence, there is no indication that the jury will choose to rely
upon such evidence only for the instructed purpose. Given the poten-
tial prejudice that can arise from such a scenario, the Nitz limiting
instruction requirement, though facially adequate, is in fact wholly un-
reliable for ensuring that the jury properly weighs such evidence.
The unjustified reliance on a limiting instruction to aid a jury in
distinguishing between substantive and rehabilitative evidence seem-
ingly has been furthered by the court of appeals recently in Nusun-
ginya v. State.104 In Nusunginya, the court of appeals affirmed the
conviction of the defendant, Thomas Nusunginya, who was charged
with sexually assaulting his daughter, C.N.. 0 5 Nusunginya was
charged with raping C.N., who reported the rape to her ten-year-old
cousin two or three days later, and to her aunt four or five days after
the incident occurred.' 0 6
The court of appeals found that C.N.'s cousin had properly been
allowed to testify about the report of rape that C.N. made to her, as a
Greenway prompt complaint. 10 7 Additionally, the court found that
both C.N.'s cousin's testimony and her aunt's testimony about her re-
port of rape were admissible under Alaska Rule of Evidence
801(d)(1)(B) as prior consistent statements.'08 The first three Nitz cri-
teria for admission of the statements were met in Nusunginya. 10 9 The
fourth requirement, however, that the trial court instruct the jury that
instructions, the Chicago researchers found that only one of 18 persons interviewed
remembered the judge's instruction well enough to follow it. See Hoffman & Bradley,
Jurors on Trial 17 Mo. L. Rnv. 235 (1952). The authors of the study concluded that
their study demonstrated "the wisdom of trial lawyers who fight hard to get a particu-
lar piece of evidence before the jury, even though they know the judge is going to
strike it out." See Note, Limiting Instruction-Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN.
L. REV. 264, 266 (1966). This evidence complements the experience of many learned
jurists and scholars who have entertained no doubt that limiting instructions are use-
less, and act as a "judicial placebo." See, e.g., United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d
574 (2d. Cir. 1956) (in which the definition of placebo as a "medicinal lie" was com-
pared to its legal equivalent, "a judicial lie").
104. 730 P.2d 172 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
105. Nusunginya was convicted pursuant to ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.434(a)(2)(B)
(1983).
106. Nusunginya, 730 P.2d at 173.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 174.
109. Id.
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the prior consistent statements could only be considered for the lim-
ited purpose of evaluating the witness' credibility, was not met. The
court of appeals recognized this omission and nonetheless found the
absence of a limiting instruction to be "harmless under the circum-
stance of... [the] ... case." 0 The court of appeals' determination
that the fourth Nitz criterion of a limiting instruction was not neces-
sary to admit prior consistent statements reveals that court's retrench-
ment from an already questionable standard of protection for
defendants. Furthermore, it seems to indicate that the court's actions
were shaped to fit the facts of the case in a result-oriented fashion.
The court correctly recognized that since Nitz had not been de-
cided after Nusunginya went to trial, the Nitz requirement of a limiting
instruction was unnecessary.II Notably, however, the court of ap-
peals provided two other lines of analysis for justifying its decision.
First, it focused on the fact that Nusunginya's attorney requested a
limiting instruction after his objection to the admission of the two
prior consistent statements was overruled.1 2 While this analysis ar-
guably is dicta, the court's observation implies that the requirement of
a limiting instruction is in fact not a requirement at all, but rather is a
privilege that will only reluctantly be granted upon request. Taken a
step further, the court of appeals' mention of the defense's failure to
request a limiting instruction implies that none of the Nitz require-
ments are strictly necessary.
This interpretation is supported by the court of appeals' second
dicta argument in Nusunginya, that the limiting instruction was un-
necessary because the facts of the case, taken in concert, did not re-
quire the fulfillment of all the Nitz requirements. The court of appeals
in Nusunginya delved into a comparison of the facts in Nitz and
Nusunginya, and concluded that "[t]he circumstances of... [Nusun-
ginya] ... do not give rise to the same concerns that led to reversal in
... [Nitz]."' " The court stated that in Nitz the fear was that "the jury
might well be apt to lose sight of the need to base its verdict on the
credibility of the victim's testimony." 1 4 The very same potential for
confusing the jury about the value and importance of the prior consis-
tent statements existed in Nusunginya, however, and this danger was
furthered by the lack of a limiting instruction. As a result, the require-
ment in Nitz of a limiting instruction seemingly has been transformed
into one of four criteria which the court can weigh in concert and in
any manner of its choosing when considering the admission of prior
110. Id.






consistent statements.1 15 Any test that involves a series of "criteria"
which are to be considered as a whole is far easier to meet than the
stricter test where each step in a four-part requirement must be inde-
pendently met. Thus, the court of appeals in Nusunginya seems to
have abandoned the purported concern that hearsay evidence be used
only sparingly against defendants. In short, the court of appeals has
engaged in a result-oriented retrenchment from safeguards it had es-
tablished only one year earlier, thereby valuing the conviction of a
"bad guy" over judicial precedent.
In Nitz the court of appeals considered the application of the
prompt complaint doctrine as an alternative theoretical basis for ad-
mission of T.K.'s report to her neighbor, Paula Hall, that she had been
sexually abused by her father. The analysis of the court's use of the
prompt complaint further reveals the result-oriented nature of its con-
cerns. Furthermore, the foregoing analysis brings into question
whether the Alaska courts have the authority to establish a prompt
complaint doctrine, since one does not exist in the Alaska Rules of
Evidence. Before considering the Nitz court's treatment of prompt
complaints, however, it is appropriate to review the common law his-
tory of that doctrine.
V. THE PROMPT COMPLAINT DOCTRINE
At common law, testimony that the victim promptly complained
of being sexually abused against her will was admissible as evidence.
A statement of prompt complaint, often called fresh complaint, was
most frequently admitted in rape prosecutions.1 6 This theory allowed
rape complaints to be admitted as evidence to corroborate the victim's
testimony in order to negate an inference of silence inconsistent with
the victim's story.1 17 The doctrine's underlying rationale was that if
the victim remained silent, it might be assumed that the rape never
happened. With prompt complaint testimony, the jury might infer
115. Nitz v. State states that "the court... must instruct the jury that the state-
ment ... should be considered for the limited purpose of determining the credibility of
the declarant's trial testimony.... ." 720 P.2d 55, 68 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (empha-
sis added).
116. The prompt complaint doctrine has been applied in various types of cases.
See, e.g., Hollenquist v. State, 394 So. 2d 385 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980), cert. denied, 394
So. 2d 389 (Ala. 1981) (child molestation case); People v. Taylor, 66 Mich. App. 456,
239 N.W.2d 627 (1976) (rape case); State v. Ramsey, 573 S.W.2d 720 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978) (sodomy case); State v. Crissman, 31 Ohio App. 2d 170, 287 N.E.2d 642 (1971)
(incest case).
117. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 297 (3d ed. 1984); 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3,
§§ 1134-1135; People v. Damen, 28 Ill. 2d 464, 193 N.E.2d 25, 30-31 (1963); Annota-
tion, Declarant's Age as Affecting Admissibility as Res Gestae, 83 A.L.R. 2D 1368
(1962).
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that the victim's silence was the result of fear or shame through the
evidence of the prompt complaint.""8 Early English common law re-
quired a showing that the victim raised the "hue and cry," which was
a general alarming of the neighborhood, in all cases of violent crimes,
including sexual offenses.' 19 Such complaints were considered part of
the necessary corroboration of the case. Since the hue and cry concept
came into existence before the rules against hearsay, testimony that an
alleged victim of sexual abuse made a prompt complaint, and testi-
mony by a third party identifying the assailant were unobjectionable.
Additionally, any person who heard the complaint could testify not
only to the fact of the complaint, but also to what the victim said. 120
Through the centuries, courts gradually removed the burden of
showing hue and cry for crimes of violence. The victim's initial com-
plaint, and details of the offense, however, continued to be admitted
into evidence. As the rule against hearsay developed, English courts
began to hold that the details of the complaint were inadmissible be-
cause the witness was not under oath nor subject to the pressures of
cross-examination when the complaint was first made.121 By the time
the common law rules of evidence were being applied in the American
colonies, the details of the complaint, including the name of the assail-
ant, were considered inadmissible hearsay. Only the fact of the com-
plaint was automatically admissible, and the details of the complaint
were admitted only upon satisfaction of the excited utterance
requirements. 122
Although the doctrine of hue and cry disappeared long ago as an
element of the prosecution's case, its rationale continues to support the
admissibility of some prompt complaints. 123 Courts employ three dif-
ferent theories to support admission of the complaint. One theory rea-
sons that the complaint should be admissible because the inference of
recent fabrication of the charge will solidify if there is no testimony of
a prompt complaint. 124 A second theory admits the complaint as a
prior consistent statement which will corroborate the testimony of the
prosecuting witness, so long as the witness' testimony has been prop-
erly impeached on cross-examination. 25 The third theory admits the
118. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1135.
119. See Graham, The Prompt Complaint Doctrine, supra note 12, at 491; see gen-
erally 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, §§ 1134-1135, 1760-1761.
120. Graham, The Prompt Complaint Doctrine, supra note 12, at 491.
121. Id. at 491-92.
122. Id. at 492.
123. Id. In the State of Washington the prompt complaint doctrine is still called
"hue and cry." See State v. Fleming, 27 Wash. App. 952, 621 P.2d 779 (1980).
124. Graham, The Prompt Complaint Doctrine, supra note 12, at 489-90; see also 4
J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 1135.
125. Graham, The Prompt Complaint Doctrine, supra note 12, at 490.
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statement of complaint if it meets the requirements of the hearsay ex-
ception for an excited utterance. 126 Each of these theories is distinct.
Consequently, different requirements and limitations apply to the evi-
dence of prompt complaint, depending on which of the three theories
supports admission of the evidence. Nevertheless, courts often con-
fuse the theories, or conflate their requirements into single interpreta-
tions, resulting in confusing and contrary rulings. 127
The Federal Rules of Evidence have no provision for the admis-
sion of testimony that the victim made a prompt complaint of sexual
abuse. Since sexual abuse issues rarely arise in federal court, this
omission is not surprising. In many states, however, prosecutors have
urged the adoption of a prompt complaint doctrine under one of the
three theories delineated above. 128 Thus, courts in states that have
adopted evidentiary rules based upon the Federal Rules of Evidence
have been required to determine the admissibility of statements of
prompt complaint when the applicable rules are silent on the sub-
ject. 129 Since the Federal Rules of Evidence do not provide a specific
hearsay exception for third party recitation of prompt complaint, how-
ever, the trial courts in jurisdictions adopting evidence codes modeled
on the Federal Rules lack specific authority to admit such statements
as substantive evidence. 130
In Greenway v. State, "'1 the Alaska Supreme Court considered
the existence of the prompt complaint doctrine in light of the Alaska
Rules of Evidence. Harold Greenway was convicted of raping his
thirteen-year-old stepdaughter. The rape occurred in July, 1978, near
Greenway's summer fishing camp on the banks of the Yukon River.
According to the complainant, Greenway threatened to kill her if she
told anyone about the rape, and so she told no one other than her
126. Id.; 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, §§ 1134, 1139. See also supra note 98.
127. Graham, The Prompt Complaint Doctrine, supra note 12, at 490; see, e.g.,
People v. Taylor, 66 Mich. App. 456, 461, 239 N.W. 2d 627, 630 (1976). The court
discussed all three theories, and then upheld the admission of hearsay testimony made
three weeks after the indictment and "corroborating the details of the alleged statu-
tory rape" under the theory of res gestae. Id. Under none of its three theoretical
bases does the prompt complaint doctrine call for corroboration of details. Id. See
also Fitzgerald v. United States, 412 A.2d 1, 9-10 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (confusing the
prompt complaint doctrine with the requirement of corroboration, and viewing the
complaint as the means to rehabilitate the complaining witness' testimony).
128. Graham, The Prompt Complaint Doctrine, supra note 12, at 490.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 509.
131. 626 P.2d 1060 (Alaska 1980).
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mother. 132  In September she reported the rape to her school
counselor. 133
At trial the state, over Greenway's objection, presented testimony
by the complainant's school counselor concerning her complaints of
rape. 134 Greenway contended on appeal that the trial court's failure to
exclude this testimony as inadmissible hearsay constituted reversible
error. 135 The state contended that the statements in question were ad-
missible under the special hearsay exception concerning complaints of
the victim, 136 which was recognized in Torres v. State. 137 Torres, de-
cided before the promulgation of the Alaska Rules of Evidence, held
that "statements concerning the crime of rape or sexual assault,
shortly after the commission of the act are admissible as a recognized
exception to the hearsay rule." 138 The Greenway court found that the
"shortly after" time constraint required in Torres extended to the two
month period between the commission of the act and the first com-
plaint, citing authority that allowed even a nine month period between
the act and the "prompt" complaint. 139
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the substantive admissibility
of the prompt complaint as a common law hearsay exception, recog-
nizing that the Alaska Rules of Evidence were not yet in effect at the
time of Greenway's trial.14° The court noted that Rule 803 of the
Alaska Rules of Evidence has no such hearsay exception for a prompt
complaint.14 1 It stated that "[t]his omission, however, was more in the
nature of an oversight on our part and not a repudiation of Torres; we
shall refer the question of whether the rules should be amended to
include the exceptions noted in Torres to our standing committee on
the Evidence Rules."142
132. There was conflicting testimony presented as to whether the victim actually
told her mother of the rape. The victim testified that she told her mother of the rape
three days after it happened, but her mother interpreted the incident differently, and
denied that she knew of the rape until after her daughter's school counselor discussed
it with her in September. See Greenway, 626 P.2d at 1060 n.l.
133. Id. at 1060.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1060-61.
136. Id.
137. 519 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1974).
138. Id. at 793 n.9 (quoting 2 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 313 (C.
Torcia 13th ed. 1972)).
139. Greenway, 626 P.2d at 1061 (citing Hunt v. State, 44 Ala. App. 479, 213 So.
2d 664, cert denied, 282 Ala. 727, 213 So. 2d 666 (Ala. 1968)).





VI. PROMPT COMPLAINT DOCTRINE UNDER NiTz AND ITS
PROGENY
In Nitz v. State, the court of appeals was faced with determining
whether the prompt complaint doctrine established in Greenway con-
tinued in effect after the rules of evidence were enacted. The defend-
ant argued that no such doctrine had been established in Greenway,
since the question was referred by the Greenway court to the standing
committee on the rules of evidence 43 and no such amendment had
subsequently been made to the Alaska rules. The Nitz court was un-
convinced by this reasoning, however, and instead chose to interpret
Greenway to indicate the Alaska Supreme Court's creation of a rule of
evidence. 144 This decision marked a display of authority which argua-
bly neither the Alaska Supreme Court nor the court of appeals techni-
cally possesses. The Nitz court "buttressed" its argument by citing
Contreras v. State, 145 which was read to support the survival of Green-
way as a "pre-existing rule" to the adoption of the rules of evidence. 146
Contreras recognized, however, that the Greenway court had referred
to the standing committee on the evidentiary rules to determine
whether the prompt complaint doctrine survived the enactment of the
Alaska Rules of Evidence. 147 The logic of leaving the establishment of
rules of evidence to the legislature is based not only on technical sepa-
ration of powers considerations, but on practical concerns about en-
suring that there be one final arbiter in creating a new rule. The Nitz
court read previous common law with a highly prejudiced eye towards
achieving a specific result: the establishment of a prompt complaint
doctrine.
The problem with Nitz's prejudiced interpretation of Greenway is
heightened considerably by the fact that the opinion did not ade-
quately delineate the scope of the prompt complaint doctrine. The
problematical nature of determining what statements fit within the ru-
bric of prompt complaint is best revealed in the court's confusing anal-
ysis of the hearsay statements T.K. made to others that the court
found admissible under Greenway. In his appellate brief Nitz argued
that the hearsay testimony provided by the five individuals who alleg-
edly were told about the assault was not at all "fresh" or "prompt."
The testimony admitted in Nitz's trial provided the details of T.K.'s
143. Brief for Appellant, supra note 89, at 18.
144. Nitz, 720 P.2d at 62-63.
145. 718 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1986).
146. Nitz, 720 P.2d at 62 (citing Contreras, 718 P.2d at 136).
147. Contreras, 718 P.2d at 136 n.21. Contreras determined, inter alia, that the test
for the admission of expert testimony obtained through a scientific technique which
was established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), commonly
known as the "Frye test," survived the enactment of the Alaska Rules of Evidence.
Contreras, 718 P.2d at 134.
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reports, the name of the assailant, and detailed renditions of the place
and type of sexual assault. 148 Paula Hall's testimony provides a com-
pelling example of the degree of detail that the court allowed in her
rendition of the prompt complaint: "She said he would make her put
his noodle in her mouth, all of their clothes came off as soon as
mommy left, and what else did she say. She did say that he had tried
to put his noodle in her and it hurt so bad that she bit him and he
slapped her in the face." 149
The Nitz court found that this statement, among others conveyed
by Paula Hall at trial, was admissible under the prompt complaint
doctrine. The confusing language of the Nitz opinion makes it difficult
to understand whether the court actually considered the admission of
details such as the ones stated by Paula Hall to be permissible. At one
point, the Nitz court states:
[b]ecause the doctrine is founded on the assumption that evidence of
the victim's first complaint is necessary to counteract the inference
of silence that might otherwise be drawn, such evidence has tradi-
tionally been limited to proof of the fact that a complaint was made.
Details of the victim's first report, including the identity of the as-
sailant, have not generally been considered admissible. 150
The Nitz court's holding, however, directly contradicts its reason-
ing for limiting the scope of prompt complaint doctrine:
In our view, however, these circumstances... (surrounding Hall's
testimony)... did not render Paula Hall's testimony concerning the
first complaint inadmissible. We perceive little need for artificial
limits on a witness' account of the circumstances under which the
victim's initial report of sexual assault is made. The jury should
generally be permitted to consider these circumstances in assessing
the weight to be given to the prior statement. 51
The difficulty in reconciling the two statements made by the Nitz
court is not lessened by further scrutiny. The court did not clarify
precisely what it meant by the "circumstances" surrounding Paula
Hall's testimony which could permissibly be heard by the jury. As-
suming a prompt complaint doctrine is properly created, it is sensible
that the permissible circumstances of the encounter between T.K. and
Paula Hall should include testimony about the location, date, and time
of the conversation-the evidentiary foundations that procedurally al-
low the testimony be admitted in the first place-and not the details of
the testimony. Allowing in only the fact of the complaint itself would
not result in "artificial limits," but would represent an effort to ensure
148. Brief for Appellant, supra note 89, at 19-20.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 20 (citing transcript at 247).
151. Nitz, 720 P.2d at 62 (emphasis added).
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that only the minimum of hearsay evidence is present to potentially
prejudice the jury's qualitative reliance on testimony.
Moreover, the Nitz decision provides no guidance on the maxi-
mum period of time that may transpire between the alleged assault
and the first complaint in order for such hearsay testimony to be ad-
missible under the prompt complaint theory. The court in Nitz con-
cluded that the period of time need only be "adequately explained,"' 5 2
without providing any guidance on how to determine the value of such
explanations, or of how such explanatory facts are to come to be ad-
mitted into evidence.
Finally, Nitz questions the value of concealing the identity of the
assailant during the prompt complaint testimony. "Identity will sel-
dom be an issue in ... [child sexual assault cases], . . . and even the
least astute of jurors will readily be capable of surmising that the vic-
tim's complaint was directed at the parent who has been charged with
the offense." 153 The assumption made by the court, that the identity
of the assailant can be revealed since it is so obvious anyway, is unsup-
ported by even a shred of empirical evidence. This sort of reasoning
further reveals the court's myopic, though well-intended focus solely
on the facts at hand, since only the stepfather was charged in Nitz.
Presumably, in other cases more than one person could be charged
with sexual assault, and identity might be a central issue in the case.
The court of appeals has considered the application of the prompt
complaint doctrine twice since the Nitz opinion, first in Vandiver v.
State, 154 and then in Nusunginya v. State. 155 In Vandiver, the defend-
ant appealed his conviction for sexually abusing and assaulting his
fourteen-year-old daughter, J.C..156 J.C. had made a complaint to a
social worker, Ford, shortly after one of the occasions of sexual abuse.
At trial, Vandiver asserted that J.C. acted out of revenge for being
"grounded" by him, and J.C.'s mother corroborated the assertion that
J.C. had earlier fabricated allegations to "get her way." 157
The court of appeals reversed Vandiver's convictions, basing its
reversal on the impropriety of admitting evidence of J.C.'s statements
to Ford as a prompt complaint,158 and because Vandiver's prior con-
viction was impermissibly mentioned at trial.159 The court expressed
its disapproval for the application of the prompt complaint doctrine in
cases where consent is not an issue, which includes child sexual assault
152. Nitz, 720 P.2d at 63.
153. Id.
154. 726 P.2d 195 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (decided in November 1986).
155. 730 P.2d 172 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (decided in December 1986).
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cases. The Vandiver court stated: "Where, as here, consent is not in
issue and the defendant's theory of defense implicitly concedes that no
inferences may be drawn from post-incident silence.., the trial court
erred in admitting J.C.'s statement to Ford as a prompt complaint." 16
Thus, Vandiver appeared to have limited the use of the prompt
complaint doctrine to cases in which consent is an essential element in
the proof of the crime. Since consent is not normally an essential ele-
ment of proof in establishing a child sexual assault case, 161 a logical
extension of Vandiver's limitation of the use of prompt complaints
makes the doctrine inapplicable to all child sexual assault cases.
In Nusunginya v. State, 162 decided only one month after Vandiver,
the court of appeals inexplicably added a further layer of confusion to
the prompt complaint doctrine. In Nusunginya, the trial court had
permitted the victim's neighbor, Donna Long, to testify about acts
that the victim told Long had been perpetrated against her by the de-
fendant. 163 Long was permitted to go beyond the fact that the com-
plaint was made, and was allowed to describe some of the details of the
victim's statement. The court of appeals upheld the convictions, find-
ing that "Long's testimony helped provide a context in which the com-
plaint could be viewed." 164 The court's use of the term "context" is
difficult to understand, as the facts of the victim's complaint to Long
are details, and are not a contextual framework at all. The "context"
of the testimony logically should involve information about when and
where the complaint was made, not a description of what details were
told. The use of the term "context" apparently was little more than a
linguistic ruse for the admission of details declared when a prompt
complaint was made.
Additionally, Nusunginya confusingly focused on the Vandiver
warning against the admission of prompt complaints when they would
not serve to counter an implication of consent. The court of appeals
attempted to distinguish Nusunginya from Vandiver, stating that un-
like Nusunginya, "in Vandiver the accused relied on a defense that was
implicitly inconsistent with the rationale that supports admission of
first complaint evidence." 165 Presumably, the Nusunginya court
160. Id. at 201.
161. None of the Alaska criminal statutes defining sexual abuse of a minor includes
the requirement of consent in order to obtain a conviction under the statute. See
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.434 (1983) (sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree); id.
§ 11.41.436 (1983) (sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree); id. § 11.41.438
(1983) (sexual abuse of a minor in the third degree); id. § 11.41.440 (1983) (sexual
abuse of a minor in the fourth degree).
162. 730 P.2d 172 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
163. Id. at 173.
164. Id. at 174.
165. Id. at 174 n.1.
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meant by this statement that in the present case, the accused did rely
on a defense of consent, thereby rendering the prompt complaint doc-
trine applicable in order to counter the implication of consent. This
analysis focuses on whether a consent defense has been raised as the
determining factor in a case in which the applicable child sexual as-
sault statutes neither mention consent as an essential element of the
offense, nor as a defense. In short, the Nusunginya court identifies the
raising of an irrelevant defense as the triggering mechanism for admis-
sion of a prompt complaint.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is clear from both the Nitz opinion and from its progeny that
the court of appeals is genuinely concerned with providing innovative
methods for the admission of hearsay statements of child sexual as-
sault victims. The Nitz court correctly observed that the victims of
child abuse, due to their immaturity, inarticulateness, and propensity
for becoming confused are less than ideal witnesses. 166 Furthermore,
as there are only rare situations where a witness to the sexual assault
exists, the issue of guilt or innocence almost invariably comes down to
a swearing match between the child victim and the adult defendant.
Recent public outcries for action to be taken against a perceived rising
tide of child molesters served additionally to pressure the court of ap-
peals to reconsider the evidentiary safeguards for defendants.
Militating against the pressures for relaxation of the evidentiary
rules, however, are two concerns. First, there exists a longstanding
policy of protecting the accused from unfair prejudice. To quote Nitz:
Where a case hinges on the credibility of a single witness who is an
inarticulate child, it can be fundamentally unfair to allow the bulk
of a child's testimony to be presented through a parade of articulate,
experienced, adult witnesses who impart to the child's statements
the mature eloquence of adulthood and a sense of their own credi-
bility, while adding nothing of substance but the force of
repetition. 167
Second, there exists a necessity for respecting the uniform appli-
cability of the evidentiary rules. For the Alaska Rules of Evidence to
function effectively, they must be applied evenly. The particular cir-
cumstances of a case, even one so urgent in content as a child sexual
assault case, should not affect the manner in which the evidentiary
rules are applied.
The Nitz decision, however, apparently applies a result-oriented
exception to the generally understood notion that prior consistent
statements must predate the motive to fabricate. In its zeal to deal
166. Nitz v. State, 720 P.2d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986).
167. Id. at 61.
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with the evidentiary problems that arise in child sexual assault cases,
the court of appeals has "used" a rule designed for uniform applica-
tion to meet its specific ends. While the intentions of the court may be
worthy, the result is potentially debilitating to the integrity of the rules
themselves. Seemingly, the court has not considered how it will react,
or how other Alaska courts should respond, if its reinterpretation of
the requirements of 801(d)(1)(B) are met by a litigant in, for example,
a non-child sexual assault criminal case, or in a civil matter.
Thus, the Alaska Supreme Court should utilize the first opportu-
nity that arises to overturn the Nitz interpretation of evidentiary rule
801(d)(1)(B). Such a ruling will serve not only to protect the rights of
accused child molesters, but of all defendants to whom the Alaska
Rules of Evidence apply. The integrity of the rules must be main-
tained not merely out of some academic sense of balance, but in order
to indicate both to judges and litigants that the codification of such
rules actually requires their uniform application.
The Nitz application of the prompt complaint doctrine, and the
confusing development of that doctrine in Vandiver and Nusunginya,
also arose from the court of appeals' desire to tackle the perceived
child sexual assault problem in Alaska. As was argued earlier in this
note, the court of appeals relied upon the supreme court's indication in
Greenway that the judiciary in Alaska was empowered to carve out at
will exceptions to the rules of evidence. The strictly legalistic problem
arising from such a judicial usurpation of legislative power should be
considered by the supreme court and the court of appeals. Moreover,
the integrity of the rules of evidence is challenged by the "develop-
ment" of this prompt complaint doctrine, just as it is by the reinterpre-
tation of the Nitz prior consistent statement requirements. These
considerations provide reason enough to demand reversal of the
prompt complaint doctrine as applied in Alaska.
The problem of admitting a child's prompt complaint of sexual
assault into evidence still exists, however. Thus, it is suggested that
the Alaska legislature add an exception to the rule against hearsay that
would allow the out-of-court statement of prompt complaint by a
child victim of sexual abuse under the age of ten to be admitted at
trial, so long as the testimony is strictly limited to the existence of the
complaint, and the time and place where it was made. The prohibition
against going into the details of the complaint should only be dropped
when the defendant opens the door to the admission of such informa-
tion on cross-examination.
Such an amendment to the rules of evidence will have the effect of
providing a legitimate, legislatively mandated, and minimally intrusive
diminution of child sexual assault defendants' right not to be
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prejudiced by hearsay evidence. While from a purely academic per-
spective the creation of such an exception might not be justified, its
existence will at least ensure that the doctrine recently applied in Nitz
and its progeny is reasonably limited in scope. Moreover, it will send
a signal to the Alaska courts that the legislature is aware of the
problems attendant upon child sexual assault prosecutions, thereby re-
moving the temptation to skew the rules of evidence, and diminish the
value that exists in their ability to establish uniformity in the eviden-
tiary procedures.
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